PINEDA v. TAYLOR

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

FRANK PINEDA, a man,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

JOHANNA MARIE TAYLOR; RIKKI JORGENSEN; JACQUI MEADOWS;
BRIGHTON JORGENSEN; WILLIAM WOLFF,
Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0070
FILED 01-26-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
No. S0300CV202300619
The Honorable Brent Davidson Harris, Judge Pro Tempore
The Honorable Elaine Fridlund-Horne, Judge, Retired

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Frank Pineda, Flagstaff
Plaintiff/Appellant

Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., Phoenix
By William D. Holm, Anthony J. Julian, Arcangelo S. Cella
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Johanna Marie Taylor
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Rikki Jorgensen, El Mirage
Defendant/Appellee

Jacqui Meadows, Portland, Tennessee
Defendant/Appellee

Brighton Jorgensen, Phoenix
Defendant/Appellee

William Wolff, Glendora, California
Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David B. Gass and Judge Andrew M. Becke joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Frank Pineda (“Pineda”) appeals from the superior court’s
order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Johanna Marie Taylor
(“Taylor”). For the reasons below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Pineda and Taylor were in a domestic relationship for many
years. Though Pineda says that he and Taylor are married, she denies it,
and he has not provided a marriage certificate.

¶3 In 2010, Pineda bought a property in Flagstaff, Arizona. Nine
years later, he conveyed the property to Taylor by quitclaim deed. During
their relationship, the parties owned and operated multiple businesses,
including Miracles Electrical Contractors, Inc. (“Company”).

¶4 In May and November of 2020, Taylor obtained two orders of
protection against Pineda. Taylor later sold the Flagstaff property along
with various items of personal property allegedly owned by Pineda.

¶5 In December 2023, Pineda filed a 112-page complaint alleging
numerous claims against Taylor relating to ownership of the Flagstaff
property and certain personal property items. The claims included breach

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of fiduciary duty, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, conversion,
unjust enrichment, fraudulent concealment, fraud, civil conspiracy, and
promissory estoppel. He requested a temporary injunction, a temporary
order of protection, and rescission. Taylor filed a pro se answer, denying
Pineda’s allegations and claims for relief.

¶6 After hiring counsel and with the superior court’s approval,
Taylor filed an amended answer. On April 23, 2024, Taylor moved for
judgment on the pleadings, arguing Pineda’s complaint failed to satisfy
basic pleading standards and did not raise any legally viable claims. On
May 10, Pineda filed a motion asking the court to take judicial notice of
various documents from governmental agencies, presumably to support
his complaint and to support his allegation that he and Taylor were married
in Nevada. The motion also included a request for Taylor to file a “response
in substance” to the complaint. Because Pineda did not file a response to
the motion for judgment on the pleadings, Taylor filed a notice explaining
that the motion was “ripe for decision in her favor.”

¶7 The superior court then issued an order striking “all
counts/claims” in Pineda’s complaint except Count III (conversion and
unjust enrichment). The court gave Taylor 20 days to file a supplemental
answer to address Count III and to allege any affirmative defenses. After
Taylor filed her supplemental answer and the case was re-assigned to a
different judge, the court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings,
dismissing Pineda’s complaint with prejudice as to all defendants. A final
judgment was entered and Pineda timely appealed. We have jurisdiction
under A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(1), -120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 As best we can tell, Pineda seems to argue the superior court
erred by dismissing his claims against Taylor because she improperly
interfered with his property rights by selling property that belonged to him.
Thus, arguably he has raised an issue whether the court erred in granting
judgment on the pleadings as to Count III. Pineda, however, has not argued
the initial judge erred by striking the remaining counts. Thus, he has
abandoned any issues concerning that ruling. See Robert Schalkenbach Found.
v. Lincoln Found., Inc., 208 Ariz. 176, 180, ¶ 17 (App. 2004) (“Generally, we
will consider an issue not raised in an appellant’s opening brief as
abandoned or conceded.”).

¶9 We also note that the superior court granted motions to
dismiss filed by defendants Brighton Jorgenson, Rikki Jorgenson, and

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Jacqui Meadows, and later confirmed the dismissal of all defendants,
including William Wolff, when it granted Taylor’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings. Because Pineda has raised no issues in his opening brief
challenging the dismissal of those four defendants, he has abandoned any
claim that the court erred in dismissing his claims against them. See Robert
Schalkenbach Found., 208 Ariz. at 180, ¶ 17.

¶10 Turning to Taylor’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
relating to Count III, because Pineda did not file a response, it was within
the superior court’s discretion to grant the motion solely on that basis. See
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(b); Strategic Dev. & Const., Inc. v. 7th & Roosevelt Partners,
LLC, 224 Ariz. 60, 65, ¶ 17 (App. 2010) (“Because Strategic failed to file a
timely response to the motion to dismiss, the court had the power to grant
the motion for that reason alone.”).

¶11 Also, Pineda’s briefing fails to comply in any meaningful way
with the rules governing appellate brief preparation. See ARCAP 13(a)(5),
(7) (opening brief arguments must contain “references to the record on
appeal where the particular issue was raised and ruled on, and the
applicable standard of appellate review with citation to supporting legal
authority”). Although Pineda represents himself, he must comply with the
same standards as attorneys. See Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, 83–84, ¶ 24
(2017).

¶12 Pineda’s lack of compliance here means he has waived any
issues or arguments relating to the superior court’s judgment. See Ramos v.
Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522, ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (“An appellant who fails to make
a bona fide and reasonably intelligent effort to comply with the rules will
waive issues and arguments not supported by adequate explanation,
citations to the record, or authority.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). For example, he has failed to: (1) include any substantive
argument section, instead referring this court to an argument section that
does not exist, (2) cite any supporting authority, and (3) cite relevant
portions of the superior court record. Given that Pineda’s briefing does not
reasonably comply with any aspect of ARCAP 13, he has waived any
challenge to the superior court’s ruling and has abandoned his appeal. See
id. at 523, ¶ 11.

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CONCLUSION

¶13 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT

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